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While the informal sector has received widespread attention in academic and policy
arenas in recent decades, knowledge gaps and controversies remain. By examining
the incidence and determinants of the formal-informal sector earnings gap for adult
male dependent employees using two identical, nationally representative labor force
surveys for Serbia—one just prior to the impact of the recent international financial
crisis and one about a year into the crisis—for three alternative measures of
informality, this paper adds to our understanding in several dimensions. Among
the main results is the finding of a substantively large formal-informal sector
earnings gap (favoring the formal sector)—across three alternative informality
measures—which appears to have decreased substantially overall following the crisis.
Additional results suggest that formal sector workers are concentrated in better
paying industries and occupations and have more education and other favorable
characteristics than informal sector workers, and at the same time also have higher
returns to their (already favorable) characteristics overall, with education and
part-time status consistently among the main drivers of the observed gap.
JEL classifications: I24, J31, J42, J46.
Keywords: Formal-informal sector earnings gap; Labor market segmentation;
Earnings decomposition; Detailed earnings decomposition; International financial
crisis; Serbia1 Introduction
Since the concept of the informal sector was first introduced by Hart (1971), the infor-
mal sector has received substantial attention both in the academic literature and in the
policy arena.1 But even despite the wealth of available evidence, some issues are still
poorly understood. First, what exactly is the informal sector? Despite years of research
and public policy debate, it does not seem that the concept is used in a uniform, trans-
parent way. Some definitions seem to be based on legality versus illegality (especially
in terms of tax evasion), others on whether workers receive benefits such as health
and/or pensions benefits or not, while still others seem to be based solely on the size
of a given enterprise, characterizing small enterprises as informal and larger ones as
formal. Yet, what is “small” and “large” is clearly debatable—and likely also highly
contextual, as may be some of the other (potential) informality measures. For example,2015 Blunch. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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tion countries (Lehmann and Pignatti 2007).2 It therefore seems appropriate, when
desiring to explore some aspect or other of the informal sector, to adhere to not just a
single definition but to apply a multifaceted framework, incorporating instead several
alternative definitions of informality.3 Second, despite the amount of empirical evidence
currently available for both developed and developing countries, the evidence from the
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia is still scarce, though
starting to emerge (Lehmann 2010; 2015). The issue here is the relative scarcity of data
available for these countries, though this is likely to change in the coming years as
more and higher quality data becomes available from these countries. Third, only little,
if anything, is known about the impact of international financial crises on the informal
sector. The issue again here is lack of relevant data since, fortunately, the international
crises are few and far between.
Again, while the available evidence on the extent and the nature of the informal
sector in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia is scarce in
general, it is particularly scarce for the case of Serbia. Krstić and Sanfey (2011) is the
closest in spirit to the present study, examining the extent and evolution of informality
and earnings inequality in Serbia between 2002 and 2007. Of most interest to the scope
and contribution of the present paper is the finding that informal employees earn sub-
stantially less than formal employees, namely about 45 percentage-points (in 2007 but
not in 2002)—though when controlling for other factors, this gap decreases to about 29
percentage-points. The main emphasis is on earnings inequality per se, however, and so
this study does not consider decompositions of the formal-informal sector earnings
gap. The scope of Koettl (2010) is also on informality in Serbia but focusing on the
relationship between labor taxation and benefit design, on the one hand, and work
incentives, on the other, as well as the consequences of informality on the Serbian
economy focusing on the fiscal implications in terms of lost revenues. The paper
therefore does not directly touch on the formal-informal sector earnings gap. However,
with the main conclusion that for many low skill/low earning workers it simply does
not pay to work in the formal sector (due to minimum social security contributions,
coupled with the design of social assistance and family benefits). Koettl (2010) provides
a useful analytical motivation for the analysis undertaken here—and therefore also
complements the present study well. While the scope of Kogan (2011), examining a
specialized survey on school leavers in Serbia in 2006, is also on the informal sector, the
focus is more narrowly on the role of credentials and contacts on job entry in Serbia.
Among the main findings are that education dropouts are largely attracted to the informal
sector, while the better educated are attracted to the formal sector. Networks are found to
be important especially for employment in the informal sector. In turn, these results—to-
gether with those in Koettl (2010)—help to understand better the nature of the informal
sector in Serbia as one of severe marginalization. This point is also the main finding in
Macias (2009), which is mainly a descriptive paper, examining the 2008 Labor Force
Survey.
In response to these issues, this paper specifically examines the incidence and
determinants of the formal-informal sector earnings gap for male dependent employees
in Serbia in the context of the recent international financial crisis. In so doing, an
important motivation of this paper is to add to our currently fairly limited understanding
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 3 of 34regarding the formal-informal sector earnings gap of the former socialist regimes of
Eastern Europe and Central Asia in general (see, however, Lehmann (2015)) and of Serbia
in particular by trying to understand better both the extent of the formal-informal
sector earnings gap and the factors driving this gap across multiple dimensions of
informality—as well as whether any such patterns, if found to be present, have changed
following the onset of the crisis.
The case of Serbia is particularly interesting in this connection both because the
informal sector appears quite pervasive in Serbia, employing about a third of the
private sector, but also since there seems to be several plausible causes for a pervasive
informal sector in Serbia, not least due to the tax-system (Koettl 2010). Additionally,
and not least important, the Serbian Labor Force Survey (LFS) provides high quality
data to study these issues.
Specifically, in terms of empirical methodology, the paper first examines the raw
formal-informal sector earnings gaps across the three alternative measures of informal-
ity for the LFS in October 2008 (i.e., pre-crisis) and again in October 2009 (i.e., post-
crisis), as follows: (1) official (non) registration as pertaining to tax-purposes; (2) lack of
formal contract; and (3) lack of pension benefits. The next step of the analysis estimates
Mincer earnings regressions and then decomposes the resultant formal-informal sector
earnings gap in the Blinder (1973); Oaxaca (1973) tradition, as well as performs detailed
decompositions following Oaxaca and Ransom (1999); Yun (2005).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, the next section reviews
recent developments in Serbia, focusing at issues relevant for the formal-informal sector
earnings gap. Section 3 presents the data, discusses the construction of the dependent
and explanatory variables, as well as the three informality measures, and estimates the
raw formal-informal sector earnings gaps for all three measures both pre- and post crisis.
This is followed, in section 4, by a discussion of the estimation strategy and related issues.
Section 5 presents the main results starting with the results from the Mincer earnings
regressions, then the overall decompositions and finally the detailed decompositions.
Section 6 concludes, discusses policy implications, and provides directions for further
research.
2 Background: labor markets, legislation and informality in Serbia
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 followed in Serbia, as in other former
socialist countries, formally the transition towards a market economy. For the case of
Serbia, though, those first 10 years were no race towards a market economy, for
sure—as perhaps most clearly summarized by Babović (2008: 13), “During the last dec-
ade of the twentieth century, Serbian society was characterized by a state of blocked
transformation that included the obstruction of essential changes in market economy
and political democracy by the ruling elite. A profound economic crisis, a deterioration
of social institutions, wars with grave economic, social and humanitarian consequences,
the impoverishment of a large portion of the population, the expansion of the informal
economy and the hampering of the development of civil society, were the main charac-
teristics of Serbian society in this period.”
Since then, however, Serbia has witnessed substantial growth—about 6% per capita
per year between 2000 and 2006—but at the same time still remains one of the poorest
countries in Europe (OECD 2008: 15). Turning to the labor market, employment has
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sized enterprises and in peasant farming (OECD 2008: 17). The reason for the in-
creased unemployment during a time of widespread growth is due to (as was the case
for many transition economies besides Serbia) labor hoarding before the transition so
that the increased unemployment became a consequence of the economic restructuring
and privatization embedded with the transition (Arandarenko 2007).
One measure taken to try to combat the declining employment is improved
legislation, where an important step was taken in 2004 with the creation of a new
Business Register Agency. The aim of this Agency was to coordinate several adminis-
trative functions that previously required contact with different authorities. In addition
to this, starting in 2006, this Agency also keeps records of “entrepreneurs,” i.e., self-
employed own-account workers with or without employees, and handles their enrollment
in social insurance (OECD 2008:22). The overall aim of this is to stimulate the creation of
individual companies in Serbia and thereby stimulate overall economic growth in the
Serbian economy, thus leading also to increased employment.
While there, thus, have been improvements in Serbian legislation vis-à-vis an improved
business environment and increased employment opportunities, many obstacles still
remain. Indeed, it has been suggested that due to the specific nature of the Serbian tax
and benefit system, the value of social security contributions that are associated with
formal employment have to be extremely high to offset the opportunity costs of formal
employment, particularly for low-wage earners (Koettl 2010: 9).4 The reason for this is
minimum social security contributions, as well as the design of social assistance and
family benefits. Considering these as a package, informal workers at low wages would
have to give up a considerable amount of their informal earnings were they to
“formalize” instead, and it is unlikely that the value of social security entitlement (and
other benefits like formal employment protection legislation) that they get in return for
formalization will exceed these implicit costs. Notably, the same holds for the inactive
part of the labor market, when considering formal work at low wage levels. Koettl
(2010: 9) goes on to conclude that, “In other words, so called-mini jobs and midi-
jobs—that is, part-time jobs that pay less than the full-time minimum wage—are hardly
economically viable in Serbia. Hence, workers with low educational attainment—like
the informally employed and the inactive—might by and large be excluded from formal
work in Serbia.” Additionally, if working, it would likely be for lower wages, just as
would be the case for informal sector workers—which is in line with the theories of
segmented labor markets (Lewis 1954; Kuznets 1955). Indeed, according to Fields
(2009), the distinguishing feature of this view is “the fact that workers earn different
wages depending on the sector of the economy in which they are able to find work.”
The above discussion, on the other hand, provides at least part of the explanation of
the generally found “stylized fact” that informal sector workers tend to be less educated
and lower earning (or vice versa) than formal sector workers—specifically for the case
of Serbia: namely, the role of legislation, and here specifically the design of social
security, social assistance and family benefits.
3 Data and descriptive analysis
The empirical analyses of this paper examine household survey data from two rounds
of the Serbian Labor Force Survey (LFS), October 2008 (i.e. pre-crisis) and October
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that is representative at the national level. In the first stage, enumeration areas were
selected systematically with probability proportional to the size of the population aged 15
and above (the target population) using the sampling frame of the 2002 Census. In the sec-
ond stage households were selected within the enumeration areas with equal probability
(simple random selection). The initial weight arising from the initial sampling design was
further corrected ex-post to allow for non-response, aiming at creating sampling weights
that make the sample nationally representative (these weights are used in all subsequent
estimations). The survey contains information on labor market status, earnings, occupa-
tion, sector, industry, firm size, benefits and other labor related information, and on back-
ground variables such as age, gender, educational attainment, and area of residence, which
are also important factors5 in analyses of earnings determinants. A list of all the variables
used in these analyses as well as their definitions is given in Table 1. The definition of vari-
ables is discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section.
Starting with the informality measures, the survey distinguishes between the different
types of ownership—specifically, among private firms, a distinction is made between
registered and non-registered firms, where the registration pertains to taxes and other
payments and regulations. The first dimension therefore is based on a dummy variable,
which is one if a worker works in a private, non-registered firm and zero otherwise.
From Table 2 presenting the means and standard deviations of the informality mea-
sures, the incidence here is quite small, however—at only about 2–3%, depending on
the time period. Fortunately, it is possible to define two additional, alternative informal-
ity measures. The second measure is based on a worker’s contract status and is defined
as one if a worker has a contract and zero otherwise. Benefit receipt is the third dimen-
sion of informality explored here. I again construct a binary measure; this time it is de-
fined as one if a worker does not receive pension benefits and zero otherwise.6
Altogether, the measure based on contract status is the preferred measure, with the
pension benefits based measure a fairly close second, followed by the (il)legality meas-
ure.7 In terms of the dynamics of the three informality measures, Table 2 reveals that
the informal share of all dependent workers has decreased overall. This is especially
true for the pension-based measure, which is likely due to the impact of the crisis put-
ting more pressures on social protection demands, including pensions.
To help better understand these measures, especially their potential interrelatedness,
Table 3 presents the correlations among the three informality measures. From these re-
sults the three measures appear highly correlated, though the two preferred
measures related to contract status and benefits receipts are particularly highly
correlated—supporting the desirability of these two measures.
While firm size has been used as a measure of informality in the literature, as also
argued in Lehmann and Pignatti (2007); Lehmann and Zaiceva (2015) this measure
may not be a very precise measure of informality, especially for transition countries. To
examine this issue further, I tabulate firm size across the three informality measures
(Table 4). From these results the overlap is quite small, never exceeding about a
fifth—and frequently much less—so that most of the employees in small firms actually
are formal employees. In turn, this supports the findings and recommendations in
Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) for the case of Ukraine—and I therefore limit the subse-
quent analyses to the three informality measures discussed and defined earlier.
Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable name: Definition:
Dependent variable:
Log real earnings (Oct. 2008, Oct. 2009) Log real monthly earnings (net salary in the previous month)
Informality measures:
Unregistered firm 1 if firm is not formally registered (for tax purposes, etc.); 0 otherwise
No labor contract 1 if worker has no labor contract; 0 otherwise
No pension benefits 1 if worker does not receive pension benefits; 0 otherwise
Explanatory variables:
Birth cohorts:
15–24 (reference) 1 if in age range; 0 otherwise
25–34 1 if in age range; 0 otherwise
35–44 1 if in age range; 0 otherwise
45–54 1 if in age range; 0 otherwise
55–64 1 if in age range; 0 otherwise
65 and above 1 if in age range; 0 otherwise
Educational attainment:
Primary or less (reference) 1 if completed primary or less; 0 otherwise
Secondary 1 if completed secondary; 0 otherwise
Tertiary 1 if completed tertiary; 0 otherwise
Part-time status:
Part-time 1 if part-time; 0 otherwise
Industry:
Agriculture (reference) 1 if Agriculture; 0 otherwise
Man/Min/Electricity 1 if Manufacturing-Mining-Electricity; 0 otherwise
Construction 1 if Construction; 0 otherwise
Trade/Services 1 if Trade/Services; 0 otherwise
Hotels/Restaurants 1 if Hotels/Restaurants; 0 otherwise
Transports 1 if Transports; 0 otherwise
Finance/Real estate 1 if Finance/Real Estate; 0 otherwise
Public sector 1 if Public Sector; 0 otherwise
Other 1 if Other Sector; 0 otherwise
Occupation:
Legislators 1 if Legislator; 0 otherwise
Professionals 1 if Professional; 0 otherwise
Technicians 1 if Technician; 0 otherwise
Clerks 1 if Clerk; 0 otherwise
Service 1 if Service; 0 otherwise
Skilled agriculture & fishery 1 if Skilled agriculture & fishery; 0 otherwise
Craft & trade 1 if Craft & trade; 0 otherwise
Plant/machine operators 1 if Plant/machine operator; 0 otherwise
Elementary occupations (reference) 1 if Elementary occupation; 0 otherwise
Firm Size:
Firm size 1–5 (reference) 1 if firm size is 1–5; 0 otherwise
Firm size 6–19 1 if firm size is 6–19; 0 otherwise
Firm size 20-99 1 if firm size is 20–99; 0 otherwise
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Table 1 Variable Definitions (Continued)
Firm size 100+ 1 if firm size is 100 or more; 0 otherwise
Firm size not sure: 10 or less 1 if not sure about firm size but it is 10 or less; 0 otherwise
Firm size not sure: 11 or more 1 if not sure about firm size but it is 11 or more; 0 otherwise
Geographical location:
Urban 1 if urban; 0 if rural
Central Serbia 1 if Central Serbia; 0 otherwise
Belgrade (reference) 1 if Belgrade; 0 otherwise
Vojvodina 1 if Vojvodina; 0 otherwise
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the month before October 2008 and October 2009, respectively). Unfortunately, this
information is only collected from employees, so that the self-employed and owner-
operators which potentially is an important part—and certainly is a large part of the
overall Serbian informal sector, as can also be seen from Table 5—must be excluded
from the analysis. As a result, the analysis in this paper examines a specific part of the
overall Serbian informal sector, namely the part that contains employed workers who
obtain a salary. Additionally, in many transition economies even workers in the formal
sector receive part of their earnings in an informal fashion, in terms of so-called “enve-
lope payments” (Lehmann (2010). While the survey question pertains to net salary, it is
possible that envelope payments may still not be reported fully in the survey in which
case the formal-informal earnings gap will be underestimated. Relatedly, non-cash com-
ponents of formal sector earnings—like social security benefits, employment protection,
severance payments, job security, credit worthiness, access to loans, and so on—will
also work to widen the earnings gap even further. Unfortunately, however, there is not
information on these components in the LFS.
While one might argue that (hourly) wages are preferable to (monthly) earnings, there
are at least two reasons why earnings may actually be preferable to wages, even when
hours worked is available in the dataset (which is the case here). First, for policy pur-
poses the worker’s take-home earnings seems to be the main object of interest since
that is what he or she ultimately will use to sustain the livelihood of his or her house-
hold. Second, earnings is an already noisy variable, riddled with measurement error, so
that dividing earnings with hours worked will attenuate the overall measurement errorTable 2 Incidence of male informal dependent employment in serbia over the first year of the
financial crisis using three alternative informality measures: october 2008 and october 2009
October 2008 October 2009
(1) Not formally registered 0.033 0.025
[0.178] [0.155]
(2) No labor contract 0.098 0.061
[0.297] [0.240]
(3) No pension benefits 0.111 0.064
[0.314] [0.245]
N 2,783 2,577
Notes: Estimations incorporate sampling weights. Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980)
standard errors
Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2008 and October 2009)
Table 3 Examining the intra-correlation of the three informality measures: October 2008 and
October 2009


















0.522 1 0.478 1
(3) No pension
benefits
0.486 0.912 1 0.388 0.767 1
N 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,577 2,577 2,577
Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2008 and October 2009)
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tential problems with the wage rate measure, a sensitivity analysis will still be performed
to check for the robustness of the choice of dependent variable, in terms of (monthly)
earnings versus (hourly) wages.
Among the key explanatory variables is age, which helps control for potential
general experience, among other things. To obtain as flexible functional form as
possible, a series of birth cohorts are created: 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and
65 and above.8 Educational attainment is measured as the highest level completed,
ranging from “Without education” through “PhD.” I consider a set of three binary
variables corresponding to the completion of primary or less (reference), secondary,
and tertiary education. Among the work related variables, I first construct a dummy
variable for part-time work. Notably, from Tables 6 and 7, part-time status is particu-
larly prevalent for the informal sector, with the incidence of part-time work among
informal sector workers being more than 10 times more than that of formal sector workers.
Industry and occupation clearly are potentially important determinants of earnings, as
well, and are each included as a series of nine dummy variables (reference group for
industry: agriculture; reference group for occupation: elementary occupations). From
Tables 6 and 7, the informal sector is dominated by Agriculture and Construction, while
Manufacturing/Mining/Electricity plays a major role in the formal sector (accounting for
about a third of the dependent employment in the sector) but a much smaller role in the
informal sector. In terms of occupations, the informal sector is dominated by elementary
occupations (including unskilled agriculture and fishery), with between about a third and
half of the dependent workers belonging to this group depending on the informality mea-
sures. These results indicate once again how the informal sector in Serbia may well be
considered “the marginal sector.” Firm size is also a potentially important determinant of
earnings and is included as a set of six dummies, with 1–5 employees as the reference cat-
egory. Lastly, the urban dummy and the region of residence cluster fixed effects capture
economic conditions specific to the area (as well as everything else related to the region
in question), which are potentially important in explaining labor earnings.
Gender-issues may potentially confound the analysis9, so to enable focusing more
narrowly on the formal-informal sector earnings gap, the sample is initially restricted to
the 2,978 males in October 2008 and 2,796 males in October 2009 who are employed
and are 15 years of age and above. Additionally, information on some observations is
missing for either the dependent variable or for one or more of the explanatory
Table 4 Examining overlap of firm size and the three informality measures: October 2008 and October 2009 (Percent)
October 2008 October 2009
(1) Not formally registered (2) No labor contract (3) No pension benefits (1) Not formally registered (2) No labor contract (3) No pension benefits
No: Formal Yes: Informal No: Formal Yes: Informal No: Formal Yes: Informal No: Formal Yes: Informal No: Formal Yes: Informal No: Formal Yes: Informal
6+ employees 98.5 1.5 93.3 6.7 92.3 7.7 98.7 1.3 95.9 4.1 95.7 4.3
1–5 employees 91.3 8.7 80.7 19.3 78.2 21.8 93.8 6.3 87.4 12.7 86.7 13.4
N 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,577 2,577 2,577
The rows (firm size by informality measure) do not sum to exactly 100% in a few cases due to rounding. Bold numbers: This is the grouping where the informality measure in question "agrees" with the firm size
measure in terms of the informality classification–so the closer this number is to 100, the greater the agreement (and vice versa)














Table 5 Distribution of employees, self-employed and unpaid family workers in the larger
sample of all working (but not necessarily enumerated) individuals in the Informal sector using
three alternative informality measures: october 2008 and october 2009













Employee 14.7 18.0 25.3 17.0 16.1 24.1
Self-employed 77.5 70.6 61.5 71.7 70.0 61.2
Unpaid family
worker
7.9 11.4 13.2 11.3 13.9 14.7
N 672 1,644 1,344 606 1,448 973
Notes: Estimations incorporate sampling weights
Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2008 and October 2009)
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2008 estimation sample and 2,577 observations for the October 2009 estimation sam-
ple. Descriptive statistics for the analysis samples across informality status are reported
in Tables 2, 5, 6 and 7.
To get an initial handle on the formal-informal earnings gap during the first year-
and-a-bit of the international financial crisis, Table 8 presents log earnings for the
formal and informal sector for the October 2008 sample and the October 2009 sample,
using all three alternative informality definitions discussed previously. To obtain results
in percent rather than log-points, the earnings gaps are also presented in their de-
logged form.10
A few results from the table are rather striking. First, the formal-informal sector
earnings gap is pervasive, no matter the definition or time period considered.11 In turn,
this is also in line with the predictions from the literature on segmented labor markets
that the lower productivity—or “marginal”—sector also receives the lower wages (Lewis
1954; Kuznets 1955). Second, however, there is a bit of a range in the estimated raw
earnings gap—ranging from about 47 percentage-points to about 60 percentage-points
in October 2008 and ranging from about 20 to about 27 percentage-points in October
2009, depending on the informality measure considered. In turn, these results confirm
earlier findings (Krstić and Sanfey 2011) of a substantial formal-informal earnings gap
in Serbia in 2007—though, at about 43 percentage-points, this gap was somewhat
smaller than the gaps estimated here for the earlier period and somewhat larger than
the gaps estimated here for the later period (likely due to differences in both the data
and informality measure used).12 Third, considering the three informality measures
overall, the earnings gap narrowed substantially following the crisis for all three
measures. Examining the evidence as a whole, however—incorporating the size of the
changes, as well as the relative desirability of the measures as “true” informality
measures—it is evident that the overall formal-informal sector earnings gap decreased
substantially following the crisis. Again, since “envelope payments” likely have fallen
more than reported payments, the decrease in the earnings gap is potentially
overestimated.
So what might account for these differences in earnings between the two sectors
more generally—and for the narrowing of the gap following the crisis? The previous
section discussed how Serbian legislation related to minimum social security
Table 6 Means and standard deviations of monthly earnings and explanatory variables by
formality status using three alternative informality measures: october 2008
(1) Formally registered? (2) Has labor contract? (3) Receives pension benefits?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Ln Monthly earnings 10.067 9.204 10.102 9.456 10.108 9.482
[0.528] [0.823] [0.496] [0.762] [0.493] [0.736]
Informality measure:
Unregistered firm 0.000 1.000 0.002 0.311 0.002 0.273
[0.000] [0.000] [0.046] [0.464] [0.046] [0.446]
No labor contract 0.069 0.94 0.000 1.000 0.002 0.863
[0.253] [0.239] [0.000] [0.000] [0.045] [0.345]
No benefits 0.082 0.94 0.017 0.981 0.000 1.000
[0.275] [0.239] [0.128] [0.135] [0.000] [0.000]
Age cohort:
15–24 0.077 0.254 0.067 0.224 0.066 0.215
[0.266] [0.438] [0.250] [0.418] [0.248] [0.411]
25–34 0.242 0.233 0.239 0.27 0.239 0.268
[0.429] [0.425] [0.427] [0.445] [0.427] [0.444]
35–44 0.268 0.174 0.268 0.232 0.267 0.245
[0.443] [0.381] [0.443] [0.423] [0.443] [0.431]
45–54 0.274 0.217 0.285 0.154 0.287 0.151
[0.446] [0.414] [0.451] [0.361] [0.452] [0.359]
55–64 0.137 0.107 0.139 0.11 0.139 0.112
[0.344] [0.311] [0.346] [0.313] [0.346] [0.316]
65+ 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.01 0.002 0.009
[0.048] [0.123] [0.044] [0.100] [0.044] [0.094]
Educational attainment:
Primary or less 0.143 0.556 0.123 0.461 0.124 0.415
[0.350] [0.500] [0.329] [0.499] [0.330] [0.494]
Secondary 0.668 0.429 0.678 0.503 0.678 0.523
[0.471] [0.498] [0.467] [0.501] [0.467] [0.500]
Tertiary 0.189 0.015 0.199 0.037 0.198 0.062
[0.391] [0.123] [0.399] [0.188] [0.399] [0.241]
Part-time 0.02 0.313 0.013 0.182 0.011 0.183
[0.141] [0.466] [0.115] [0.387] [0.104] [0.387]
Industry:
Agriculture 0.045 0.402 0.035 0.252 0.035 0.227
[0.206] [0.493] [0.184] [0.435] [0.183] [0.420]
Man/Min/Electricity 0.351 0.091 0.364 0.144 0.364 0.176
[0.477] [0.290] [0.481] [0.351] [0.481] [0.381]
Construction 0.103 0.409 0.088 0.341 0.09 0.293
[0.304] [0.495] [0.284] [0.475] [0.287] [0.456]
Trade/Services 0.134 0.047 0.131 0.131 0.13 0.139
[0.340] [0.212] [0.337] [0.338] [0.336] [0.347]
Hotels/Restaurants 0.03 0 0.025 0.06 0.025 0.058
[0.170] [0.000] [0.158] [0.239] [0.157] [0.234]
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Table 6 Means and standard deviations of monthly earnings and explanatory variables by
formality status using three alternative informality measures: october 2008 (Continued)
Transports 0.09 0.037 0.095 0.022 0.097 0.019
[0.286] [0.191] [0.294] [0.147] [0.296] [0.138]
Finance/Real estate 0.047 0.000 0.049 0.014 0.048 0.026
[0.212] [0.000] [0.216] [0.119] [0.214] [0.161]
Public sector 0.148 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.159 0.011
[0.355] [0.000] [0.365] [0.000] [0.366] [0.106]
Other 0.053 0.013 0.054 0.036 0.052 0.049
[0.224] [0.113] [0.225] [0.186] [0.222] [0.217]
Occupation:
Legislators 0.043 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.047 0.000
[0.203] [0.000] [0.210] [0.000] [0.211] [0.000]
Professionals 0.106 0.000 0.113 0.006 0.113 0.02
[0.309] [0.000] [0.317] [0.076] [0.317] [0.140]
Technicians 0.142 0.013 0.149 0.033 0.148 0.06
[0.349] [0.113] [0.357] [0.179] [0.355] [0.238]
Clerks 0.069 0.053 0.073 0.029 0.073 0.037
[0.254] [0.225] [0.261] [0.169] [0.260] [0.188]
Service 0.13 0.000 0.127 0.119 0.126 0.125
[0.336] [0.000] [0.333] [0.325] [0.332] [0.331]
Skilled agriculture & fishery 0.007 0.09 0.004 0.061 0.004 0.053
[0.082] [0.288] [0.062] [0.239] [0.063] [0.225]
Craft & trade 0.252 0.325 0.249 0.3 0.25 0.289
[0.434] [0.471] [0.433] [0.459] [0.433] [0.454]
Plant/machine operators 0.156 0.025 0.16 0.081 0.161 0.076
[0.363] [0.157] [0.366] [0.273] [0.368] [0.266]
Elementary occupations 0.094 0.494 0.078 0.371 0.078 0.339
[0.292] [0.503] [0.269] [0.484] [0.268] [0.474]
Firm Size:
Firm size 1–5 0.23 0.636 0.218 0.479 0.214 0.476
[0.421] [0.484] [0.413] [0.500] [0.410] [0.500]
Firm size 6–19 0.294 0.237 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.313
[0.456] [0.427] [0.454] [0.463] [0.454] [0.464]
Firm size 20–99 0.241 0.061 0.251 0.09 0.254 0.084
[0.428] [0.240] [0.434] [0.286] [0.435] [0.278]
Firm size 100+ 0.17 0 0.181 0.012 0.181 0.032
[0.376] [0.000] [0.385] [0.111] [0.385] [0.175]
Firm size not sure: 10 or less 0.018 0.022 0.013 0.065 0.013 0.057
[0.131] [0.148] [0.112] [0.248] [0.112] [0.233]
Firm size not sure: 11 or more 0.047 0.044 0.048 0.043 0.048 0.038
[0.212] [0.207] [0.213] [0.204] [0.214] [0.191]
Geographical location:
Urban 0.624 0.31 0.634 0.423 0.633 0.458
[0.484] [0.465] [0.482] [0.495] [0.482] [0.499]
Central Serbia 0.502 0.295 0.504 0.421 0.507 0.406
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Table 6 Means and standard deviations of monthly earnings and explanatory variables by
formality status using three alternative informality measures: october 2008 (Continued)
[0.500] [0.459] [0.500] [0.495] [0.500] [0.492]
Belgrade 0.217 0.085 0.223 0.123 0.221 0.153
[0.413] [0.281] [0.416] [0.329] [0.415] [0.360]
Vojvodina 0.28 0.62 0.274 0.455 0.273 0.441
[0.449] [0.488] [0.446] [0.499] [0.445] [0.497]
N 2,691 89 2,507 273 2,474 306
Notes: Estimations incorporate sampling weights. Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980)
standard errors
Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2008)
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 13 of 34contributions, social assistance, and family benefits may help explain the generally
found “stylized fact” that informal sector workers tend to be less educated and lower
earning (or vice versa) than formal sector workers. From Tables 6 and 7, it can be seen
that informal sector workers are indeed (much) worse off than formal sector workers
in terms of human capital. For example, in October 2008 only 14.3% of workers in for-
mally registered firms had completed primary education or less, while more than half
of workers in firms that were not formally registered had completed primary or less
(Table 6). On the other hand, almost 19% of workers in formally registered firms had
completed tertiary education, while this was the case for only 1.5% of workers in firms
that were not formally registered. From the bottom panel of Table 8, inclusion of these
factors as explanatory variables make the earnings gap shrink, though they remain
sizeable—hinting that worker characteristics are important but at the same time can-
not explain away the earnings gap (this will be discussed further in the following
sections).
Comparing Tables 6 and 7, however, it seems that the composition of the informal
sector has changed following the crisis: for example, while, again, more than half of
workers in firms that were not formally registered had completed primary or less, this
had decreased to about 37% in October 2009. Similarly, the share of workers with com-
pleted secondary education increased from about 43% to about 56% and the share of
workers with tertiary education from 1.5% to 6.6%. At the face of it, this is consistent
with formal workers (having better characteristics than informal sector workers—in
terms of education, for example) being pushed into informality due to the crisis. What
is more likely going on, however, is that the change in the composition of the infor-
mally employed is due to an outflow from informality into unemployment, since the
informal sector workers were likely the first workers to be fired—being a more flexible
segment of the labor market, not regulated by employment protection legislation. Add-
itionally, formal workers are more likely to receive unemployment benefits and would
therefore probably rather flow into unemployment than into informality. It seems,
therefore, that the outflow from informality into unemployment is biased, with the least
endowed leaving over-proportionally into unemployment, therefore overall seemingly
“improving” the endowments of the informally employed.
While the existence of substantively large formal-informal sector earnings gaps has
now been established across all three informality measures and for both the pre- and
post crisis period—and with sectoral human capital differences motivated as possibly
accounting for at least some of this gap as well as the narrowing of the gap following
Table 7 Means and standard deviations of monthly earnings and explanatory variables by
formality status using three alternative informality measures: october 2009
(1) Formally registered? (2) Has labor contract? (3) Receives pension benefits?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Ln Monthly earnings 10.079 9.437 10.096 9.572 10.093 9.637
[0.501] [0.693] [0.493] [0.605] [0.501] [0.552]
Informality measure:
Unregistered firm 0.000 1.000 0.006 0.315 0.009 0.254
[0.000] [0.000] [0.076] [0.466] [0.094] [0.437]
No labor contract 0.043 0.781 0.000 1 0.013 0.762
[0.203] [0.417] [0.000] [0.000] [0.113] [0.427]
No benefits 0.049 0.663 0.016 0.802 0.000 1.000
[0.216] [0.476] [0.127] [0.399] [0.000] [0.000]
Age cohort:
15–24 0.064 0.112 0.058 0.179 0.056 0.202
[0.245] [0.317] [0.233] [0.385] [0.229] [0.403]
25–34 0.235 0.134 0.229 0.302 0.23 0.275
[0.424] [0.343] [0.420] [0.460] [0.421] [0.448]
35–44 0.266 0.318 0.27 0.235 0.271 0.216
[0.442] [0.469] [0.444] [0.425] [0.445] [0.413]
45–54 0.28 0.308 0.288 0.18 0.289 0.171
[0.449] [0.465] [0.453] [0.386] [0.453] [0.377]
55–64 0.15 0.112 0.153 0.092 0.151 0.12
[0.357] [0.317] [0.360] [0.291] [0.358] [0.326]
65+ 0.004 0.017 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.017
[0.063] [0.129] [0.062] [0.105] [0.058] [0.129]
Educational attainment:
Primary or less 0.125 0.371 0.113 0.399 0.114 0.371
[0.330] [0.487] [0.317] [0.491] [0.318] [0.484]
Secondary 0.668 0.563 0.671 0.583 0.671 0.584
[0.471] [0.500] [0.470] [0.495] [0.470] [0.494]
Tertiary 0.207 0.066 0.216 0.018 0.215 0.045
[0.405] [0.250] [0.411] [0.132] [0.411] [0.209]
Part-time 0.013 0.297 0.01 0.183 0.01 0.167
[0.114] [0.460] [0.097] [0.388] [0.100] [0.374]
Industry:
Agriculture 0.036 0.313 0.033 0.194 0.032 0.203
[0.186] [0.467] [0.179] [0.396] [0.175] [0.403]
Man/Min/Electricity 0.346 0.163 0.354 0.137 0.35 0.206
[0.476] [0.372] [0.478] [0.345] [0.477] [0.405]
Construction 0.08 0.315 0.072 0.301 0.075 0.251
[0.272] [0.468] [0.258] [0.460] [0.263] [0.435]
Trade/Services 0.13 0.048 0.129 0.121 0.129 0.118
[0.337] [0.216] [0.335] [0.327] [0.335] [0.323]
Hotels/Restaurants 0.028 0 0.026 0.054 0.026 0.047
[0.165] [0.000] [0.158] [0.226] [0.159] [0.211]
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 14 of 34
Table 7 Means and standard deviations of monthly earnings and explanatory variables by
formality status using three alternative informality measures: october 2009 (Continued)
Transports 0.109 0.015 0.111 0.043 0.112 0.035
[0.312] [0.123] [0.314] [0.203] [0.315] [0.185]
Finance/Real estate 0.049 0.043 0.051 0.025 0.049 0.047
[0.217] [0.204] [0.220] [0.157] [0.217] [0.213]
Public sector 0.168 0 0.174 0.004 0.174 0.015
[0.374] [0.000] [0.379] [0.066] [0.379] [0.124]
Other 0.054 0.103 0.051 0.122 0.053 0.078
[0.225] [0.306] [0.219] [0.328] [0.225] [0.269]
Occupation:
Legislators 0.044 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.045 0.006
[0.205] [0.000] [0.209] [0.000] [0.208] [0.077]
Professionals 0.115 0.057 0.121 0.000 0.12 0.017
[0.319] [0.233] [0.326] [0.000] [0.326] [0.129]
Technicians 0.145 0.067 0.146 0.088 0.148 0.067
[0.352] [0.251] [0.353] [0.285] [0.355] [0.251]
Clerks 0.073 0.021 0.073 0.061 0.074 0.044
[0.261] [0.145] [0.260] [0.240] [0.262] [0.205]
Service 0.131 0.012 0.129 0.115 0.128 0.126
[0.337] [0.109] [0.335] [0.320] [0.334] [0.333]
Skilled agriculture & fishery 0.008 0.12 0.007 0.067 0.006 0.077
[0.090] [0.328] [0.084] [0.251] [0.079] [0.268]
Craft & trade 0.241 0.361 0.24 0.307 0.238 0.33
[0.428] [0.484] [0.427] [0.463] [0.426] [0.471]
Plant/machine operators 0.159 0.045 0.162 0.065 0.162 0.065
[0.366] [0.210] [0.369] [0.247] [0.369] [0.247]
Elementary occupations 0.084 0.317 0.076 0.296 0.077 0.269
[0.277] [0.469] [0.266] [0.458] [0.267] [0.445]
Firm Size:
Firm size 1–5 0.223 0.589 0.216 0.481 0.215 0.482
[0.417] [0.496] [0.412] [0.501] [0.411] [0.501]
Firm size 6–19 0.282 0.229 0.28 0.3 0.283 0.249
[0.450] [0.424] [0.449] [0.459] [0.451] [0.434]
Firm size 20–99 0.245 0.038 0.25 0.078 0.25 0.092
[0.430] [0.192] [0.433] [0.269] [0.433] [0.289]
Firm size 100+ 0.177 0.01 0.183 0.02 0.181 0.06
[0.382] [0.102] [0.387] [0.141] [0.385] [0.238]
Firm size not sure: 10 or less 0.018 0.104 0.016 0.09 0.017 0.069
[0.134] [0.307] [0.125] [0.287] [0.129] [0.255]
Firm size not sure: 11 or more 0.054 0.03 0.055 0.031 0.054 0.048
[0.227] [0.173] [0.228] [0.175] [0.226] [0.215]
Geographical location:
Urban 0.624 0.411 0.629 0.457 0.629 0.462
[0.485] [0.496] [0.483] [0.500] [0.483] [0.500]
Central Serbia 0.49 0.504 0.492 0.475 0.495 0.433
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Table 7 Means and standard deviations of monthly earnings and explanatory variables by
formality status using three alternative informality measures: october 2009 (Continued)
[0.500] [0.504] [0.500] [0.501] [0.500] [0.497]
Belgrade 0.251 0.179 0.256 0.149 0.256 0.156
[0.434] [0.386] [0.436] [0.357] [0.436] [0.364]
Vojvodina 0.259 0.317 0.252 0.376 0.25 0.411
[0.438] [0.469] [0.435] [0.486] [0.433] [0.494]
N 2,510 67 2,411 166 2,403 174
Notes: Estimations incorporate sampling weights. Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980)
standard errors
Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2009)
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 16 of 34the onset of the crisis—the objective of the main analysis of this paper is to now try to
“explain”13 these gaps in more detail in terms of, on the one hand, characteristics/en-
dowments such as educational attainment and job characteristics and returns to these
characteristics (three-fold division) and, on the other hand, observable and unobserv-
able characteristics (two-fold division). While the empirical strategy underlying this
approach is widely used, it still seems fruitful to review the main components in some
detail, especially in terms of how it is tailored to the application pursued here—which,
therefore, is the objective of the next section.
4 Estimation strategy and related issues
The starting point of the Blinder-Oaxaca approach to decompose earnings (or other)
differentials is an OLS regression of the outcome in question, estimated separately
across the two relevant groups (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973); here, workers from the
formal and the informal sector, respectively (suppressing subscripts for individual
workers):Table 8 Raw and regression-adjusted formal-informal sector earnings gap (Informal Sector Penalty)
using three alternative informality measures: October 2008 and October 2009 (in logs and de-logged)













(i) Raw Earnings Gaps:
Formal sector 10.067*** 10.102*** 10.108*** 10.079*** 10.096*** 10.093***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Informal sector 9.152*** 9.437*** 9.465*** 9.437*** 9.572*** 9.637***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.002]
IS penalty (Logs) −0.914*** −0.665*** −0.643*** −0.642*** −0.524*** −0.456***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.002]
IS penalty (De-logged) −0.599 −0.486 −0.474 −0.269 −0.195 −0.211
(ii) Regression-adjusted Earnings Gaps:
IS penalty (Logs) −0.314*** −0.217*** −0.237*** −0.307*** −0.187*** −0.140***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
IS penalty (De-logged) −0.474 −0.408 −0.366 −0.264 −0.171 −0.131
N 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,577 2,577 2,577
Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980) standard errors
***: statistically significant at 1%. Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2008 and October 2009)
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Y IS ¼ βISX þ εIS; ð2Þ
where YFS and YIS are the logarithms of monthly earnings of informal and formal
sector workers, respectively, X is a vector of workers’ characteristics (education, experi-
ence, occupation, and so on); βFS and βIS are the returns to the workers’ characteristics;
and εFS and εIS are error terms.
As such, these regressions are—at least in this context—merely inputs into calculat-
ing the decompositions. However, it is potentially fruitful to consider these auxiliary
regressions in and of themselves as separate and integral parts of the overall analysis,
also. Both because the results from these regressions directly indicate the different
returns to characteristics across informality status but also because their specification,
most notably in terms of explanatory variables, will affect the subsequent decompos-
ition results.
Human capital theory suggests that education and potential experience directly affect
earnings through the impact on individuals’ productivity in the labor market and also
suggest additional factors that are potentially important determinants of earnings such
as education, industry and sector of employment, firm size, part-time status, and
location of residence.
Hence, the first part of the multivariate analysis will examine these relationships
using ordinary least squares. This is done by first including only the informality meas-
ure (thus recovering the raw earnings gaps from Table 8), then adding all the controls,
and finally adding a full set of interactions with the informality measure. One po-
tentially important econometric issue here is that educational attainment may be
endogenous. The main concern here is possible omitted variables bias. Preferences
and ability, for example, are unobserved and at the same time also, at least to
some extent, determine both educational attainment and labor market earnings.
However, as there are not available in this dataset any variables that may poten-
tially act as instruments, it does not appear feasible to try to address this problem
using instrumental variables methods. The effect of any omitted variables will
therefore be captured by the error term, possibly causing omitted variables bias.
The same goes for part-time status, industry, and occupation, which nevertheless
are included as explanatory variables due to their potential importance for infor-
mality status.14 As a result, we must interpret any subsequent results with caution
and hence not give them a causal interpretation but rather as merely reflecting
associations with labor market earnings. Further, so as to allow for arbitrary
heteroskedasticity, the estimations will be carried out using Huber-White standard
errors (Huber 1967; White 1980).
Again, these earnings regressions formally are merely inputs into the decompos-
ition analysis. Specifically, the decomposition analysis amounts to examining to
what extent the observed earnings gaps across informality status are attributable
to differences in the observable characteristics, to differences in the returns to
those characteristics, and to the interaction of the two (“three-fold decomposition,”
see below for details) and, relatedly, to what extent the observed earnings gaps
are due to observable and unobservable characteristics (“two-fold decomposition,”
see below for details). This analysis will comprise the second part of the
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decomposition.
Formally, following the methodology of Oaxaca (1973); Blinder (1973), the difference
in mean earnings for formal and informal sector workers, denoted R, can be
decomposed into three parts (Jann 2008) using the empirical counterparts of equations
(1) and (2) above15:
R ¼ Y FS – Y IS ¼ X FS – X ISð Þβ^FS þ X FS β^FS – β^IS
 
– X FS – X ISð Þ β^FS – β^IS
 
ð3Þ
This is a three-fold decomposition (Winsborough and Dickinson 1971), where the
first term represents the “endowments effect” and explains the differences that are due
to worker characteristics (such as education, sector of employment, occupation, etc).
The second term reflects the “coefficients effect,” which shows the differences in the
estimated returns to formal and informal sector workers’ characteristics. Lastly, the
third term, the “interaction effect,” accounts for the fact that differences in endowments
and coefficients between formal and informal sector workers exist simultaneously.
If formal and informal sector workers obtain equal returns for their characteristics,
the second and the third part in equation (3) will equal zero and earnings differen-
tials between formal and informal sector workers will be explained by the differ-
ences in endowments alone.
The above decomposition is formulated based on the prevailing earnings struc-
ture of formal sector workers, i.e., the differences in endowments and coefficients
between formal and informal sector workers are weighted by the coefficients
(returns) of formal sector workers. This seems reasonable for the application here
since the formal sector is the dominating one, at least in an economic sense/size-
wise. This is therefore also the approach pursued in the subsequent analysis. Alter-
natively, however, this equation could also be represented based on the prevailing
earnings structure of informal sector workers; this will be explored further in the
sensitivity analysis.
An alternative approach, prominent in the literature on wage discrimination, is based
on the assumption that wage differentials are explained by a unifying (“non-discrimin-
atory,” in the wage discrimination literature) coefficients vector, denoted β*, which is
estimated in a regression that pools together both of the two groups under consider-
ation (here, formal and informal sector workers). Then, the earnings gap can be
expressed as:
R ¼ Y FS – Y IS ¼ X FS – X ISð Þβ^ þ X FS β^FS – β^
 
– X IS β^– β^IS
 
ð4Þ
The above equation represents the so-called two-fold16 decomposition:R ¼ Qþ U; ð5Þ
where Q ¼ X FS−X ISð Þβ^ is the part of the earnings differential that is “explained” by
sample differences assessed with common “returns” across the two groups, and the
second term U ¼ X FS β^FS − β^
 
þ X IS β^− β^IS
 
is the “unexplained” part not attrib-
uted to observed differences in formal and informal sector characteristics. The latter
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It is important to note, however, that the “unexplained” part also captures all potential ef-
fects of differences in unobserved variables (Jann 2008). And, to be sure, in the application
here it is difficult to talk about “discrimination,” per se, as it does not seem that being an
informal sector worker is an intrinsic characteristic, such as gender or ethnicity. Again
choosing the formal sector earnings structure as the reference, (4) reduces to:
R ¼ Y FS – Y IS ¼ X FS – X ISð Þβ^FS þ X IS β^FS– β^IS
 
ð6Þ
Again, while the main analysis here takes the formal sector earnings structure as the
17reference, several different specifications for the baseline specification, i.e., β^ in (4),
will be pursued in the sensitivity analysis as a robustness check.
The standard errors of the individual components in equations (3) and (4) above are
computed using the Delta method by applying the procedure detailed in Jann (2008),
which extends the earlier method developed in Oaxaca and Ransom (1998) to deal with
stochastic regressors.
In addition to examining the overall composition of the established earnings gaps, it
would seem instructive to perform detailed decompositions as well, whereby it would
be possible to see which explanatory variables contribute the most to the three- and/or
two-fold overall decompositions. An issue here is that while the overall decompositions
are always identified, the results for categorical variables in detailed decompositions
depend on the choice of the reference category (Oaxaca and Ransom 1999). A possible
solution to this problem is to apply the deviation contrast transformation to the
estimates before conducting the decomposition (Yun 2005); this is also the approach
pursued here. Similar to the OLS regressions, the decomposition estimations also all
allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity (Huber 1967; White 1980). So as to condense the
wealth of results obtained here—thereby easing the interpretation of the many
results—the detailed decompositions are done groupwise rather than for each individ-
ual variable (for example, for education as a whole, rather than separately for primary
or less, secondary, and tertiary education). Here, too, the focus will be on the case
where the formal sector is taken as the reference sector, though the sensitivity analysis
again will consider alternative specifications as well.
In addition to the sensitivity analysis using different specifications for the weight of
the formal sector in the decomposition analysis and the potential endogeneity of part-
time status, I perform several additional robustness checks. Two sensitivity analyses
relates to the relevant estimation sample—on the one hand restricting the sample to
only prime age (25–64 years of age) males, on the other adding females in the estima-
tions. Despite the potential issues with using wage rates here, also discussed earlier, a
sensitivity analysis with (hourly) wage rates as the dependent variable—instead of
(monthly) earnings—is performed as well. Lastly, to help both examine more and jus-
tify better the negative selection into informal jobs referred to earlier, I estimate simple
regressions of the determinants of informality status.
5 Results
This section reviews the main results from the formal-informal sector earnings analysis
for the Serbian Labor Force Survey from October 2008 and October 2009, thereby
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during the first year or so of the international financial crisis.18 This is done in four
main parts: (i) OLS Mincer earnings regressions, (ii) overall earnings decompositions
(both two- and three-fold), (iii) detailed earnings decompositions (again both two- and
three-fold), and (iv) sensitivity analysis.
5.1 Mincer earnings regressions
The Mincer earnings regressions are estimated for three different specifications
for each of the three alternative informality measures: (i) only including the infor-
mality variable (thus recovering the raw formal-informal sector gaps from Table 3),
(ii) adding controls, (iii) adding a full set of interactions with the informality
measure.
For each survey, the results are remarkably consistent across the three informality
measures. First, for all three measures the initial raw earnings gaps discussed previously
decrease substantially when including controls (Table 8, bottom panel). For example,
the gap decreases from 59.9 to 26.9% when using formal registration of the enterprise
as the informality measure in October 2008.19 This again suggests that at least some of
the gap can be explained by observable characteristics (as will be further explored in
the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions shortly); the substantial increase in R2 when
moving from the specifications with only the informality measure to adding the con-
trols also supports this. These findings again confirm the findings by Krstić and Sanfey
(2011), where the raw formal-informal earnings gap decreases from about 43 percentage-
points to about 22 percentage-points in 2007 once controls such as age, education, and
industry are added.20 These results again also confirm the predictions from the literature
on segmented labor markets that the lower productivity, or “marginal,” sector also re-
ceives the lower wages (Lewis 1954; Kuznets 1955)—though now even when controlling
for the worse characteristics of these workers in terms of, for example, education.
Second, while the raw gap decreases substantially following the onset of the crisis, the
gap adjusted for observable worker characteristics is remarkably stable. For example,
while the raw gap decreases from 59.9% in October 2008 to 47.4% in October 2009, when
using formal registration of the enterprise as the informality measure, the adjusted gap
only decreases from 26.9 to 26.4%. In turn, this indicates that the economic disadvantage
pertaining to informality in Serbia is much more constant when taking observable charac-
teristics of formal and informal workers into account. Third, in line with previous re-
search, there are substantial returns to education, all industries experience an earnings
premium relative to the reference category of agriculture, and similarly all occupations ex-
perience an earnings premium relative to the reference category of elementary occupa-
tions, workers in urban areas experience (mostly) an earnings premium relative to
workers from rural areas, and workers from regions outside that of the capital (Belgrade)
experience an earnings penalty.
Lastly, while the many estimated coefficients make it hard to assess this precisely, the
overall impression from the fully interacted model is that informal sector workers re-
ceive a penalty on many of their observable characteristics.
In essence, the decomposition analysis—to which I now turn—formalizes and con-
denses the overwhelming results from the Mincer regressions of the fully interacted
models into more easily interpretable numbers.
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Table 9 presents the overall earnings decompositions for the three alternative informal-
ity measures across the pre- and post crisis surveys, with the three-fold decompositions
in the upper half of the table and the two-fold decompositions in the lower half of the
table.
Starting with the three-fold decomposition, a couple of results in Table 9 stand out
particularly strongly. First, the endowments increase the formal-informal sector earn-
ings gap overall, indicating that informal sector workers have relatively less favorable
observable characteristics—that is, they are concentrated in worse paying sectors
(including especially agriculture), have less education, and so on (this will be examined
more closely when considering the detailed decompositions in the next sub-section).
Second, the returns to characteristics increase the gaps in both substantive and
statistical terms, indicating that formal sector workers have higher returns to character-
istics overall.
Moving to the two-fold decompositions, informal sector workers, on average, have
worse employment-related characteristics as indicated by the positive sign in the
explained part—which in turn serves to increase the overall earnings gap. At the same
time, the unexplained part (capturing all the factors that cannot be attributed to
differences in observed worker characteristics) accounts for a sizable share of the
formal-informal sector earnings differential. Indeed, for the no labor contract and the
no pension benefits definitions of informality, the unexplained part is even larger than
the explained part (Table 9). While there does not seem to be any evidence avail-
able on formal-informal sector wage or earnings decompositions per se for Serbia,
these results are in line with those in Marcouiller et al. (1997)—for Mexico, El
Salvador, and Peru—that on the one hand observables explain sizeable parts of theTable 9 Overall earnings decompositions using three alternative informality measures: October
2008 and October 2009














Endowments 0.553*** 0.323*** 0.262*** 0.308*** 0.288*** 0.287***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Coefficients 0.151*** 0.186*** 0.230*** 0.096*** −0.162*** 0.161***
[0.011] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
Interaction 0.211*** 0.156*** 0.151*** 0.237*** 0.397*** 0.008**
[0.012] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004]
Two-fold:
Explained 0.553*** 0.323*** 0.262*** 0.308*** 0.288*** 0.287***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Unexplained 0.362*** 0.342*** 0.381*** 0.334*** 0.236*** 0.169***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
N 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,577 2,577 2,577
Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980) standard errors. The decompositions treat the formal
sector workers as the reference (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973)
**: statistically significant at 5%; ***: statistically significant at 1%. Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2008 and
October 2009)
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left unexplained.
In turn, this is indicative of the presence of what in studies of gender and ethnic
earnings differentials has been termed “discrimination” towards informal sector work-
ers—which is here instead suggested to be interpreted as reflecting non-observable
characteristics of informal sector workers such as relatively lower bargaining power and
less access to personal and professional networks (again, informality clearly is not an
innate characteristic such as gender or race). Notably, the relative shares of the
explained and the unexplained parts of the formal-informal sector earnings gap have
changed from pre- to post crisis in several cases, though not consistently so across all
three measures. For the two preferred measures, no labor contract and no pension ben-
efits, the unexplained share of the overall gap decreased substantially, from accounting
for more than half the gap (51.4 and 59.3%, respectively) before the crisis, to accounting
for less than half the gap (45 and 37.1%, respectively) one year into the crisis. In turn,
this might reflect a decreasing importance of non-observable characteristics such as
bargaining power and access to personal and professional networks, both of which are
presumably lower among informal sector workers. Similarly, this implies that
observable characteristics such as education are now relatively more important in
explaining the overall earnings gap.
But how are the overall gaps—both two- and three-fold—explained by the endowment
of and returns to the separate individual characteristics (or groups of characteristics), say,
education and industry, for example, rather than by the endowment of and returns to
individual characteristics overall? This is the object of the final main empirical ana-
lysis—the detailed earnings decompositions—following next.
5.3 Detailed earnings decompositions
While the overall earnings decompositions examined in the previous section already add
to the story about the nature of the formal-informal sector gap in Serbia established in its
“raw” form in Table 8, additional insights may be had from going one step further and
additionally decomposing these overall decompositions into the contribution coming
from the individual explanatory variables from the Mincer earnings regressions—which,
again, can be done both for the two- and three-fold decompositions. To help better facili-
tate interpretation, however, results are reported in groups of individual variables (for ex-
ample, aggregating up the contribution from all the education variables) rather than
separately for all the individual variables (for example, for each educational level).
The results from the detailed three-fold decompositions (Tables 10 and 11) reveal
that many of the observable characteristics work to widen the formal-informal sector
gap rather than to narrow it. Most notably, education and part-time status are consist-
ently important factors across all three informality measures and both time periods,
though occupation also is quite (indeed, sometimes even more) important. For ex-
ample, using no labor contract status as the informality measure, education and part-
time status are associated with a widening of the earnings gap in October 2008 of about
7 and 5 percentage-points, respectively. Occupation, at almost 11 percentage-points, is
even more important in terms of widening the gap—indicating once again how the
dominance of lowly enumerated occupations such as elementary occupations (including
unskilled agriculture and fishery), which dominate the informal sector, works to widen
Table 10 Detailed three-fold earnings decompositions: october 2008
(1) Not formally registered (2) No labor contract (3) No pension benefits
Endowments Returns Interaction Endowments Returns Interaction Endowments Returns Interaction
Age cohort 0.032*** 0.087*** −0.041*** 0.031*** −0.009*** 0.015*** 0.029*** −0.001 0.007***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001]
Education 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.287*** 0.071*** −0.010*** 0.010*** 0.061*** −0.009*** 0.017***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Part-time 0.154*** −0.340*** 0.220*** 0.051*** −0.258*** 0.096*** 0.021*** −0.334*** 0.124***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002]
Industry 0.066*** −0.039*** −0.140*** 0.021*** −0.016*** −0.026*** 0.022*** −0.022*** −0.033***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Occupation 0.163*** 0.115*** −0.01 0.108*** −0.074*** −0.061*** 0.098*** −0.056*** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.008] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Firm size 0.044*** 0.156*** −0.056*** 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.105*** 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.029***
[0.001] [0.006] [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]
Urban 0.003*** 0.017*** −0.044*** 0.004*** 0.013*** −0.021*** 0.003*** 0.017*** −0.023***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Region 0.005*** −0.115*** −0.005 0.006*** −0.014*** 0.038*** 0.001** −0.020*** 0.022***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.004] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.185*** 0.534*** 0.638***
[0.012] [0.006] [0.006]
N 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,783
Notes: Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980) standard errors, computed according to Jann (2008). The decompositions treat the formal sector workers as the reference (Oaxaca 1973;
Blinder 1973). **: statistically significant at 5%; ***: statistically significant at 1%














Table 11 Detailed three-fold earnings decompositions: october 2009
(1) Not formally registered (2) No labor contract (3) No pension benefits
Endowments Returns Interaction Endowments Returns Interaction Endowments Returns Interaction
Age cohort −0.001*** 0.200*** −0.018*** 0.022*** −0.150*** −0.020*** 0.023*** −0.021*** −0.015***
[0.000] [0.004] [0.002] [0.000] [0.004] [0.001] [0.000] [0.007] [0.001]
Education 0.053*** −0.061*** 0.035*** 0.070*** 0.129*** 0.114*** 0.060*** 0.005* −0.001
[0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004]
Part-time 0.064*** −0.110*** 0.064*** 0.019*** −0.241*** 0.086*** 0.040*** −0.080*** 0.026***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Industry 0.026*** 0.171*** −0.118*** 0.017*** −0.040*** 0.150*** 0.021*** −0.034*** 0.055***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004]
Occupation 0.074*** −0.019*** 0.028*** 0.081*** −0.076*** 0.023*** 0.076*** −0.073*** −0.064***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.006] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004]
Firm size 0.068*** −0.037*** 0.184*** 0.052*** −0.001 0.040*** 0.045*** −0.009*** 0.011***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.008] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]
Urban 0.011*** −0.020*** 0.035*** 0.011*** 0.029*** −0.039*** 0.011*** 0.023*** −0.030***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Region 0.014*** −0.037*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.043*** 0.011*** −0.013*** 0.026***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.01 0.181*** 0.363***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007]
N 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577 2,577
Notes: Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980) standard errors, computed according to Jann (2008). The decompositions treat the formal sector workers as the reference (Oaxaca 1973;
Blinder 1973). *: statistically significant at 10%; ***: statistically significant at 1%














Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 25 of 34the earnings gap. In comparison, industry “only” contributes a (still sizable) 2.1
percentage-points to the earnings gap.
The results from the detailed two-fold decompositions are mostly consistent with the
results for the detailed three-fold decompositions, so that education and part-time
status again are among the most consistently important contributors to widening the
formal-informal sector earnings gap across all three informality measures (not shown
here but available upon request).
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
As also discussed in the estimations strategy, a number of potential issues may remain
regarding the results discussed previously. I will therefore now explore these in turn,
ordered in terms of their (increasing) relative invasiveness in terms of altering various
dimensions of the main analysis presented above.21
First, while the estimation strategy followed above erred on the inclusion of explana-
tory variables (as long their inclusion was theoretically justified), it is often possible to
think of additional potentially relevant additional explanatory variables. One such
variable is marital status, whose relationship with wages and earnings has led to the
creation of an entire subfield of economics itself (see, for example, Antonovics and
Town 2004). Hence, while the main focus here is on the association between
informality status and earnings, controlling only for the “usual suspects” as according
to standard human capital theory, it still seems useful to at least examine the robust-
ness of the previous results when additionally including this variable—keeping in mind
that this variable is arguably endogenous from a theoretical point of view. Starting with
the results for the Mincer earnings regressions, augmenting the regressions with mari-
tal status22 reveals a positive and statistically significant marriage premium, of about
7% for October 2008 and about 11% for October 2009—with the increase in the pre-
mium possibly being due to the marriages of higher earning males being more likely to
survive the economic strains imposed by the financial crisis than those of lower earning
males (which similarly seem more likely to get divorced due to the economic strains
imposed by the financial crisis). Importantly, however, there is virtually no effect on the
other estimated coefficients from including marital status. In particular, the estimated
informality coefficients are identical, not differing until the third decimal. For the three-
and two fold decompositions, there are also only minimal differences when augmenting
with the marital status variable.
Second, while it appears reasonable to choose the formal sector earnings struc-
ture as the reference in this particular application, the choice of weights in the
decomposition remains controversial and may potentially give rise to different
results, depending on the weights used (Oaxaca and Ransom 1994). Among the
different alternatives, one extreme, following Oaxaca (1973); Blinder (1973), assigns
a weight of 1 to the endowments and returns of the “favored group”—here, the
formal sector workers—in the decomposition. Again, this is also the specification
used in the main analysis above (since the formal sector may be interpreted as the
dominant sector in the application here, at least in an economic sense/size-wise).
Another extreme, also included in Oaxaca (1973), assigns instead a weight of 1 to
the informal sector. Since the seminal work in Oaxaca (1973); Blinder (1973),
several alternatives in between these two extremes have been suggested, including
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of the overall sample.
The results turn out to be fairly robust across the different specifications of weights.
For the overall three-fold decomposition, for example, the results are qualitatively simi-
lar whether the decomposition is performed using the formal sector earnings structure
or the informal sector earnings structure, except for the case of the no labor contract
informality measure for October 2009, where the returns help decreasing the earnings
gap. For the overall two-fold decompositions the results are qualitatively similar across
all the different weights,23 though of course with some differences in magnitude. Turn-
ing to the detailed decompositions, the results are qualitatively similar for both the
three-fold and two-fold decompositions. In terms of magnitude, however, education
and part-time status turn out to be even more important in terms of explaining the
formal-informal sector earnings gap than for the main result reported previously. Con-
sidering, for example, the two-fold decomposition in October 2009 using the no labor
contract informality measure, the relative importance of education in explaining the
overall earnings gap using the informal sector earnings structure as base is more than
double that using the formal sector earnings structure from the main analysis. Simi-
larly, part-time status accounts for more than five times the amount of the overall gap
in this case relative to using the formal sector earnings structure from the main
analysis.
Third, there might be some concern that part-time status, industry and occupation
could be endogenous to earnings. Lacking any suitable instruments for these variables,
this can be examined a bit more by excluding these variables from the analysis, how-
ever, and then checking whether that causes any major changes to the results. I do this
by excluding each of these variables in turn and estimating the resulting reduced
specification. As perhaps can be expected, the coefficient on informality in the Mincer
regressions with the controls added becomes somewhat more negative—again consist-
ent with many informal sector workers being part-time workers and with industry and
occupation also being important determinants of the wage gap, so that the estimated
informality coefficients pick this up whenever these three other factors are excluded.
On the other hand, omitting these variables do not dramatically change the coefficients
on most of the key explanatory variables—most notably the magnitudes of the esti-
mated coefficients of the education variables are remarkably similar. The results of the
decompositions analysis are also very similar. For example, for the two preferred
measures, no labor contract and no pension benefits, the unexplained share of the
overall gap again decreased substantially following the crisis. In turn, this indicates that
part-time status, industry, and occupation are not obviously endogenous, at least not
empirically—or, at least their potential (theoretical) endogeneity does not have serious
empirical consequences. In any case, the results are fairly robust to whether these
variables are included or not.
Fourth, while the previous analysis erred on inclusion (which also helped secure
a relatively larger sample size) regarding age of workers in the estimation sample,
it could be argued that prime-age males (25–64 years of age) might be of special
interest. To examine whether the results are robust to the age specification, the
analysis is therefore also carried out restricted to only males 25–64 years of age.
The results again are quite similar, again most notably leading to very similar estimated
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decompositions analysis.
Fifth, while restricting the estimation sample in the main analysis to males ensures
that gender-issues do not confound the analysis, thus enabling focusing more narrowly
on the formal-informal sector earnings gap per se, it would still be interesting to see
whether the results are robust to this restriction. I therefore added female workers to
the estimation sample and reran the analysis. One difference, of course, is the larger
sample sizes (4,860 vs. 2,783 and 4,601 vs. 2,796, for October 2008 and October 2009,
respectively). The results are very similar to the main results, though not surprisingly
with some differences in magnitude. The results from the Mincer regressions are also
very similar to those from the main results, again showing a substantial decrease in the
coefficient for informality status, once controls are added. At the same time, again, a
sizeable fraction is left unexplained by observable characteristics. The decomposition
analysis similarly again reveals that while a substantial fraction of the earnings gap can
be explained by the less favorable characteristics of informal sector workers, a sizeable
fraction (though somewhat smaller than for the main analysis, at least for the two pre-
ferred measures) is left unexplained. At the same time, however—in accordance with the
main analysis—the unexplained part has decreased substantially following the crisis. For
the two-fold decomposition for the two preferred measures, for example, the unexplained
part for the no labor contract measure decreased from 44.5 to 38.8% of the overall gap
from October 2008 to October 2009, while the similar figures for the no pension benefits
measure are 49.0 and 30.6%, respectively.
Lastly, while it was argued that using earnings was preferable for the application here,
some might argue that wage rates are preferable to earnings. The main argument here is
that hours worked in the two sectors can be very different, which would then impose a
bias of the earnings gap. To examine this possibility, the robustness of the results to the
choice of dependent variable is explored here as the final sensitivity analysis. Rerunning
the analysis for hourly wages instead of monthly earnings leads to almost identical sample
sizes (the only difference is a drop of 3 observations for October 2008). The results are
again quite similar to the main results, though not surprisingly again with some differ-
ences in magnitude. The results from the Mincer regressions again are very similar to
those from the main specifications, again showing a substantial decrease in the coefficient
for informality status, once controls are added. At the same time, again, a sizeable fraction
is left unexplained by observable characteristics. The decomposition analysis similarly
again reveals that while a substantial fraction of the earnings gap can be explained by the
less favorable characteristics of informal sector workers, a sizeable fraction (though some-
what smaller than for the main analysis, at least for the two preferred measures) is left un-
explained. At the same time, however—in accordance with the main analysis—the
unexplained part has decreased substantially following the crisis. For the two-fold decom-
position for the two preferred measures, for example, the unexplained part for the no
labor contract measure decreased from 55.5 to 52.2% of the overall gap from October
2008 to October 2009 (so a smaller decrease than for the main analysis), while the similar
figures for the no pension benefits measure are 59.8 and 39.9%, respectively.
In conclusion, the sensitivity analysis reveals that the results from the main ana-
lysis are quite robust in several dimensions. Certainly the main results are robust
in qualitative terms, all revealing the existence of a substantively large formal-informal
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tial fraction can be explained, at the same time leaves a sizeable fraction unexplained—a
fraction which is found to have decreased substantially following the crisis.
Finally, to help both examine more and justify better the negative selection into infor-
mal jobs referred to earlier, simple (linear probability) regressions of the determinants
of informality status are estimated (Table 12). These results should not be taken as
causal but are merely meant to give an idea of the characteristics—or proximate
determinants—that appears prevalent for informal sector workers. From these results,
it appears that informal sector workers are not to be found among the prime-age
adults: they tend to be either younger (15–24 years of age) or older (65 plus) than for-
mal sector workers. Informal sector workers also tend to be less educated than formal
sector workers. Considering the contract-based informality measure, for example, infor-
mal sector workers are about 7–8 percentage-points less likely to have completed ter-
tiary education than formal sector workers. Informal sector workers also tend to be
part-time, with the lowest estimated coefficient here being about 25 percentage-
points—and most of the remaining ones being far higher. Informal sector workers also
tend to come from all other industries than agriculture (the reference sector in the
regressions for Table 12)—which certainly can be seen as a marginal sector, in line with
Lewis (1954); Kuznets (1955). Informal sector workers are far less likely to come from
more desired occupations such as legislators, professionals, technicians and service
workers than from elementary occupations (the reference group)—where the latter
again can be interpreted as a marginal occupation. Informal sector workers are more
likely to come from small firms (five or less)—the caveat using this measure as a proxy
for informality status per se notwithstanding. Lastly, there does not seem to be too
strong geographical patterns related to informality status, though there is a slight ten-
dency for informality to be more of a rural phenomenon than an urban one—though
the estimated coefficient here is small, at about minus 0.3 to about minus 0.5
percentage-points. Altogether this supports the notion of “the” informal sector as being
a sector best characterized as a marginal sector in terms of education and other
individual and job characteristics.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines the formal-informal sector earnings gap in terms of its prevalence,
magnitude, and determinants using a recent Labor Force Survey collected in Serbia
over a period roughly spanning the first year of the recent international financial
crisis using identical survey instruments—and thereby adds to our still fairly limited
understanding regarding the formal-informal sector earnings gap of the former socialist
regimes of Eastern Europe and Central Asia in general and of Serbia in particular. In so
doing, specific emphasis is on trying to understand better both the extent of the
formal-informal sector earnings gap and the factors driving this gap across multiple di-
mensions of informality—as well as whether any such patterns, if found to be present,
have changed following the onset of the crisis.
Estimation of raw formal-informal sector earnings gaps and overall and detailed
earnings decompositions leads to six main results: (1) the presence of a sub-
stantively large formal-informal sector gap (favoring the formal sector); (2) the gap
appears to have decreased substantially overall following the crisis (though with
Table 12 OLS/LPM regressions of informality status determinants: october 2008 and october 2009















25–34 years old −0.024*** −0.082*** −0.089*** −0.011*** −0.061*** −0.098***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
35–44 years old −0.035*** −0.101*** −0.103*** 0.006*** −0.076*** −0.114***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
45–54 years old −0.035*** −0.134*** −0.147*** 0.001 −0.099*** −0.135***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
55–64 years old −0.035*** −0.110*** −0.118*** −0.012*** −0.101*** −0.127***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
65 years plus 0.076*** 0.120*** 0.092*** 0.008*** −0.060*** −0.006
[0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005]
Secondary −0.024*** −0.083*** −0.079*** −0.004*** −0.070*** −0.069***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Tertiary −0.029*** −0.075*** −0.063*** −0.007*** −0.079*** −0.067***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Part-time 0.251*** 0.363*** 0.431*** 0.301*** 0.407*** 0.374***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Manufacturing/
Mining/Electrical
−0.139*** −0.217*** −0.205*** −0.107*** −0.142*** −0.142***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Construction −0.057*** −0.018*** −0.032*** −0.039*** 0.013*** −0.025***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Trade/Services −0.147*** −0.186*** −0.178*** −0.118*** −0.143*** −0.154***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Hotel/Restaurants −0.166*** −0.109*** −0.107*** −0.133*** −0.095*** −0.121***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Transport −0.130*** −0.221*** −0.228*** −0.110*** −0.138*** −0.152***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Financial/Real
Estate
−0.145*** −0.218*** −0.198*** −0.095*** −0.135*** −0.116***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Public Sector −0.133*** −0.220*** −0.219*** −0.113*** −0.152*** −0.163***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Other Sector −0.165*** −0.229*** −0.206*** −0.093*** −0.082*** −0.133***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Legislators −0.059*** −0.152*** −0.170*** −0.036*** −0.073*** −0.073***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Professionals −0.064*** −0.155*** −0.159*** −0.021*** −0.065*** −0.066***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Technicians −0.074*** −0.158*** −0.151*** −0.047*** −0.080*** −0.084***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Clerks −0.053*** −0.139*** −0.135*** −0.041*** −0.062*** −0.073***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Service −0.074*** −0.135*** −0.134*** −0.042*** −0.071*** −0.059***
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Table 12 OLS/LPM regressions of informality status determinants: october 2008 and october 2009
(Continued)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Skilled 0.011*** 0.090*** 0.057*** 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.120***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Craft/trade −0.050*** −0.104*** −0.104*** −0.024*** −0.064*** −0.051***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Plant/Machine
operators
−0.079*** −0.145*** −0.151*** −0.043*** −0.096*** −0.092***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Firm size 6–19 −0.042*** −0.049*** −0.058*** −0.037*** −0.047*** −0.062***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Firm size 20–99 −0.056*** −0.097*** −0.117*** −0.050*** −0.079*** −0.080***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Firm size 100 plus −0.061*** −0.112*** −0.120*** −0.049*** −0.078*** −0.072***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Firm size not
sure:10 or less
−0.062*** 0.130*** 0.106*** 0.058*** 0.126*** 0.079***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Firm size not sure:
11 plus
−0.047*** −0.074*** −0.098*** −0.041*** −0.075*** −0.059***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Urban −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.004*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Central Serbia −0.007*** 0.005*** −0.007*** 0 0.008*** 0
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Vojvodina 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.015*** −0.004*** 0.024*** 0.029***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.298*** 0.599*** 0.625*** 0.190*** 0.416*** 0.462***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
R2 0.242 0.325 0.305 0.189 0.237 0.212
N 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,577 2,577 2,577
Notes: Estimations incorporate sampling weights. Values in brackets are robust Huber-White (Huber 1967; White 1980)
standard errors. ***: statistically significant at 1%
Source: Serbia Labor Force Survey (October 2008 and October 2009)
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 30 of 34some variation across informality measures); (3) however, when controlling for observable
characteristics, the gap has not really changed that much following the crisis—in turn
indicating persistency in the gap once observable characteristics have been controlled for,
thus indicating that workers with relatively more favorable characteristics have been
“pushed” into informality following the crisis; (4) both endowments and the returns to
characteristics increase the earnings gap—indicating that formal sector workers are
concentrated in better paying industries and occupations, have more education, and so
on, and at the same time also have higher returns to their (already favorable) characteris-
tics overall; (5) for the two preferred measures, no labor contract and no pension benefits,
the unexplained share of the overall gap decreased substantially, thus indicating a decreas-
ing importance of non-observable characteristics such as bargaining power and access to
personal and professional networks in explaining the relative earnings position of informal
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 31 of 34sector workers; and (6) pursuing detailed decompositions of the formal-informal earnings
gap indicates that education and part-time status consistently are among the main drivers
of the observed gap across the different alternative specifications of the two- and three-
fold decompositions.
These results have strong policy implications. The finding of a substantial formal-
informal sector earnings gap and the fact that most of the informal sector workers have
less favorable personal characteristics (most notably, lower levels of education)
indicates the existence of a highly marginal sector composed of marginalized workers.
This of course is (or if not, should be) a policy concern, since these workers have
families to feed and children to raise, just as formal sector workers. At the same time,
it is also important to stress that these results do not point to an importance of infor-
mal sector wages and earnings “catching up” with formal sector wages and earnings.
After all, the informal sector effectively undermines governance and society because it
neither contributes to society (tax evasion) nor does it operate under its rules (regula-
tory evasion). Hence, the overall goal of the government would seem to be to bring the in-
formal sector into the formal sector, whereas equalizing wages would rather encourage
informal employment. Instead, policy interventions might include increased support and
programs to workers as well as re- and up-skilling of workers. Another viable policy op-
tion might be to subsidize jobs for low skilled workers (many of whom, again, work in the
informal sector) either via direct subsidies or via reducing social security contributions;
indeed, this might even give larger employment effects than subsidizing jobs for workers
of all skill levels (Lehmann 2010: 15).
Relatedly, the results are consistent with part-time work being a main driver of informal-
ity. Coupling this with the fact that part-time work carries a very high tax burden because
of minimum social security contributions in Serbia (Koettl 2010), part-time work in Serbia
simply doesn’t pay off, in particular for low-wage earners—many of which, again, are infor-
mal sector workers, working part-time. Future policy might want to consider ways in
which to try to make it more favorable for workers to switch from the informal to the for-
mal sector—for example, by introducing a system of strongly graduated social security
contributions, linked to part-time vs. full-time status. That is, an informal sector worker
joining the formal sector would start off with relatively much lower contributions and
could then later possibly “graduate” to a full-time formal sector job. If the net effect on
such a scheme decreases the incentive to continue informal part-time work, it may well be
revenue-neutral (or, perhaps, even lead to a net increase in contributions).
Endnotes
1For extensive reviews see, for example, Blunch et al. (2001); Fields (2007); Kanbur
(2009); Lehmann (2010); Perry et al. (2006); Ruffer and Knight (2007). This is also
related to the notion of segmented labor markets originating with Lewis (1954);
Kuznets (1955) and extensively discussed and reviewed more recently for the case of
developing countries in Fields (2009).
2Whereas Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) consider the case of Ukraine, I find the same
to be the case for Serbia (see Section 3).
3As also exemplified by the several dimensions included in “the” definition of informal
employment by The International Labour Organization (ILO): (i) employers and own-
account workers who work in their own non-registered enterprises; (ii) contributing family
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 32 of 34workers; (iii) members of informal producers’ cooperatives; (iv) employees whose employ-
ment relationship is not subject to national labor legislation, income taxation, social protec-
tion or entitlement to certain employment benefits; and (v) own-account workers engaged
in the production of goods exclusively for own final use by their household (Hussmanns
2004).
4The remainder of this section draws extensively on Koettl (2010).
5Somewhat surprisingly, the survey does not collect information on union member-
ship, which appears to be a potentially relevant variable when examining earnings
determinants.
6It is fairly easy to receive health insurance for free as an informal employee in Serbia:
workers with no formal income on record can get free health insurance from the health
insurance fund; hence, many of the informally employed have it, too. In addition, many
informally employed might get co-insurance through their spouse. I therefore focus on
pension benefits, only (the results are quite robust to whether or not health benefits
are also included, however).
7This ranking also roughly accords with ILO’s definition (Hussmanns 2004), also
given earlier in footnote 3.
8As a robustness check, one of the sensitivity analyses will examine the sample where
the youngest and oldest age categories are excluded from the estimation samples.
9The dynamics in the female labor market are potentially quite different from those
of the male labor market—as exemplified by, for example, the substantially lower
female labor force participation rate in many countries, including Serbia, as well as
potentially quite different determinants of that participation.
10Using the formula: Gap in percent = 100*{exp[ln(earnings gap)] – 1}. Since the log-
gap corresponds to running a regression of log earnings on a dummy of the informality
measure one might suggest instead using Kennedy’s (1981) bias correction for dummy
variables in semi-logarithmic models—however, since the variance is so small here (and
throughout the paper), the results are identical whether or not the correction is used
(to the third decimal).
11Remembering again that due to the issue of “envelope payments” the gap is likely
underestimated.
12The data examined were from the 2007 Living Standards Measurement Survey
(LSMS) and the (composite) informality measure was based on (1) workers employed with
no social contributions paid; (2) people employed in a private unregistered firm; and (3)
the employed who work at home, from door-to-door, at the flea market and other similar
places (the analysis also examined the 2002 LSMS but the gap here was virtually nil).
13With causality being an issue here due to obvious endogeneity concerns—in turn
indicating that any findings should more appropriately be viewed as indicating associ-
ation, rather than causality per se, and any conclusions similarly modified accordingly.
14Additionally, sensitivity analysis where these variables are not included is also per-
formed as a robustness check.
15In the following, bars on top of variables denote mean values, while β^ denotes
estimated coefficient values from equations (1) and (2) above.
16See Oaxaca (1973); Blinder (1973); Cotton (1988); Reimers (1983); Neumark (1988);
Jann (2008) for different approaches—basically, these differ in the relative weights they
attribute to the two groups in the decomposition.
Blunch IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:13 Page 33 of 3417Also known as the “absence of discrimination” specification in the wage discrimin-
ation literature.
18The results for the Mincer regressions, spanning a total of 8 pages, are omitted here
to conserve space (but are available upon request).
19The formal sector premium (or informal sector penalty) from the Mincer regres-
sions reported here and in the following are all de-logged, again using the formula:
earnings premium (penalty) in percent = 100*{exp[coefficent] – 1}. Due to the small
variance here, the results are again identical whether or not Kennedy’s (1981) bias
correction is used instead (to the third decimal).
20The estimated gap for the 2002 LSMS, now controlling for worker characteristics,
again was neither statistically nor substantively significant.
21The tables are omitted here for brevity but are available upon request.
22In practice, marital status is incorporated in the estimations by including three
additional dummy variables: “Married,” “Widowed” and “Divorced” (with “Single” being
the reference/omitted category).
23Again, using the alternative approaches outlined in Oaxaca (1973); Blinder (1973);
Cotton (1988); Reimers (1983); Neumark (1988); Jann (2008).
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